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http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/07/opini
I write:
Regarding the column by David Brooks entitled "The End of Philosophy." It is startling that Professor Brooks, normally such a nuanced thinker, should so deeply miss the point of moral philosophy. Brooks seems to be under the impression that the nature of morality is already established, and that the only role of moral reasoning is to promote adherence to this previously established moral code. Neither of these is true. The role of moral reasoning is to determine the correct moral principles upon which to base our actions. Morality is like any other practical discipline, such as housebuilding or public health. If we do not know what to do before we start then we will not do well.
It is also untrue that moral reasoning has never led to moral behavior. The deep cultural difference between us and our fiercest opponents stems exactly from moral reasoning. John Locke and Jeremy Bentham, and those who thought about what they thought were the major movers who brought about a transformation of Western society from an authoritarian, anti-intellectual culture into one that strives to respect the rights and promote the welfare of all its citizens. And this process continues today. The most striking modern example of moral reasoning promoting proactive moral behavior has been the explosion in respect for animal rights stemming from Peter Singer's 1975 book "Animal Liberation."
It may be true that studies overall show no correlation between moral thinking and moral behavior in individuals, but this result is misleading. I very much doubt that the researchers in any of these studies paid any attention to the moral reasoning that went into the formation of the personalities of their subjects, or to the moral reasoning that formed the views that were taught to these subjects in childhood. (For studies that are more appropriate to this issue, I recommend the work of Kristen Monroe). Moral reasoning, and the logical response of thoughtful people to that reasoning, made the culture that we so rightly value today.
I also question the presuppositions of Gazzaniga's studies. Did they compare the behavior of those who indulged in moral rhetoric before they acted to those who just acted? Or did they compare the behavior of people who had previously had histories of thinking carefully about moral issues to the behavior of people who had no such history? I suspect that if they had done the second, they would have produced different results.
The "different view of morality" that Brooks mentions is not a replacement for moral thinking. It is an important and multi-layered effort to understand just what it is that makes us capable of moral reasoning, and of how humans tend to make the kinds of decisions that they characterize as moral, but he crucially does not even begin to address the issue of what really is, and is not moral.
Morality is not like aesthetics. If you feel a sense of moral repugnance at the behavior of someone who is not hurting you or anyone else in any way, you are not making a moral judgment, you are enacting a prejudice. When Brooks says in effect that "you just know" what is right and wrong, he is giving license to those who ignore moral reasoning in favor of their intuition that it is morally wrong for women to work outside the home, or that it is morally wrong for black people to marry white people, and so on, and so on. It was precisely moral reasoning, working in concert with social science, that moved us beyond this kind of thinking.
In reference to Jonathan Haidt, we must be careful to distinguish between the actual moral reasoning based on logic and evidence, and spurious rationalizations that attempt to put a gloss of "reason" on prejudice. This is why we in the academy teach logic and attempt to promote critical thinking. The fact that people link themselves together into networks of mutual influence does not mean that they should not also consider themselves independent thinkers morally bound to formulate moral arguments as logically as they can. The worst societies as well as the best are communities of mutual influence, and the difference between the two is that in the best societies individual people think for themselves about morality.
The attempt to base morality on social cooperation founders upon a very well-known objection. Throughout our history cooperation has been practiced to the end of killing off other groups of human beings. Furthermore, evolved social cooperation does not necessarily result in a morally decent society. The social organizations that are most easily attributed to evolution often include vicious hierarchies and a marked lack of concern to individual rights and welfare.
Brooks's "third nice thing" is a consequence of moral reasoning, not of unreasoned intuition. We are sometimes lucky enough to have our unreasoned intuitions challenged by the thoughtful reasoning of our friends. This is indeed an advantage of being in a social network, but it is an advantage that stems fundamentally from moral reasoning.
The rise of the evolutionary approach to morality does not threaten the role of moral reasoning. It importantly expands our understanding of the things we must struggle against, and with as we attempt to form rational moral judgments, but it is a complementary, not a competitor theory to moral philosophy. There are no challenges here. Brooks may choose to insult philosophers by calling them "bookish," rabbis by calling them "hyper-rational," atheists by pretending that they think their reasoning is more pure than other peoples, but he brings up nothing here that is any challenge to any of these thinkers.
Similarly, Brooks reveals ignorance of the nature of science. Scientists have no book to study things that he thinks are central to moral experience. They will get to the feelings he lionizes here as they become amenable to study. And it should be superfluous to point out that the feelings he mentions impede as much as support the careful and logical moral reasoning that is necessary to establish just what individuals are responsible for, and just what is this good that we should struggle for, as an end in itself.
